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Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for
all circumstances. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on
the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to
increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail re-election chances;
this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very
robust evidence for this behaviour is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years,
budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected.
JEL classification: D72, E62, H62
Keywords: political budget cycles; Keynesian countercyclical policies;
political opportunism; local governments; Portugal.
∗Corresponding author. Radboud University, Institute for Management Research, Department of
Economics, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands, phone: +31-24-36-15507, fax: +31-
24-36-12379, email: f.bohn@fm.ru.nl.
†Universidade do Minho and NIPE, Escola de Economia e Gesta˜o, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal, phone:
+351-253604534, fax: +351-253601380, email: fjveiga@eeg.uminho.pt.
1 Introduction
It has been accepted as a stylized fact that political budget cycles are context-conditional1,
i.e. do not happen under all circumstances, but, for instance, in countries with fiscal or
government intransparencies or lack of media freedom (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Akhme-
dov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; and Veiga, Veiga and Morozumi, 2017, respectively), in
developing countries (Schuknecht, 1996 and 2000; Block, 2002; Shi and Svensson, 2006;
and Vergne, 2009), or in new democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2005), and are affected
by the political system (Chang, 2008, and Streb, Lema and Torrens, 2009) and/or the
electoral system (Aidt and Mooney, 2014). What has not been studied is the question of
how opportunistic governments respond to the regular business cycle, i.e. to (expected)
changes in economic growth. Brender and Drazen (2008) find that low growth affects
re-election chances at least in less developed countries and new democracies. Intuitively,
one would think that an (expected) recession prompts the government to counteract or,
at least, to limit the reduced re-election probability by increasing its fiscal manipulation
(see also Bohn, 2016).
This paper captures this idea in an analytical model which makes use of earlier models,
but with significant modifications. It uses the insight of Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and
Sibert (1988) that voters want to vote for the politician with the higher expected com-
petence in the future. As suggested by Lohmann (1998) voters are uninformed about
the incumbent’s competence which incumbents, too, can only judge once a new task has
been tackled more or less successfully. Shi and Svensson (2006) use the same setting, but
apply it to fiscal policy, in particular to the government’s choice of the deficit level. The
model in this paper extends their framework to allow for economic growth and inertia in
voter perceptions of economic growth. It can be shown that the government’s realistic
1 The term was coined by Franzese (2002). A literature survey is provided by de Haan and Klomp
(2013a).
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forecast for a recession2 prompts the government to expand its manipulation in election
years, i.e. produce countercyclical policy caused by opportunism rather than Keynesian
motives.3 Countercyclical policy is also present when the government expects a boom.
The main finding of the theoretical model is supported by evidence from Portuguese
municipalities. The empirical section shows that there is indeed a countercyclical policy
effect when realistic forecasts predict negative growth or unusually low growth (below
certain percentiles) in election years. The result is also robust to including or not a series
of control variables, controlling for time specific effects in several alternative ways, and
to restricting the sample to the 278 municipalities of mainland Portugal instead of using
all 308.
The theoretical analysis incorporates the idea that voters’ perception of economic devel-
opments lags behind. The main countercyclicality result would only vanish under a very
unlikely scenario; voters would have to show minimal growth perception and maximal
deficit adjustment inertia, i.e. they would have to be able to foresee the recession 100%,
but would believe that this has absolutely no effect on the deficit. If either condition is
violated, the countercyclicality result holds. We would like to argue that voter beliefs
are not fully responsive to economic forecasts, whereas the government is better able to
make use of these forecasts. Although voters may be aware of the latest GDP growth
forecasts released by international agencies such as the IMF, OECD, or European Com-
mission, they are uncertain as to how those forecasts will affect their lives and public
finances.
This is particularly relevant when thinking in terms of Portuguese municipalities. Since
2 Henceforth, we use the word recession in a loose, non-technical sense. In the theoretical model, it
means negative growth (relative to trend output). In the empirical part, we use several specifications
for the ”recession” variable including negative growth (relative to the previous year).
3 Interestingly, this result cannot be obtained for country level data. Bohn and Sturm (2016) study
various country samples of more than 100 countries as well as subdivisions of, for instance, developing
countries, transition countries, or new democracies.
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there are no regional or municipal growth forecasts, voters will find it hard to figure out
how their local economy will perform and how municipal budget deficits will be affected.
Given this uncertainty, we assume some inertia in voters’ expectations. This assumption
is also supported by Figure 1, which shows the evolution of the Portuguese Consumer
Confidence Index (produced by the National Statistics Office - INE) and of the IMF’s
real GDP growth forecasts for Portugal for the following year (taken from the October
issues of the World Economic Outlook), from 1998 to 2015.
Figure 1: Consumer Confidence and Real GDP Forecasts
It can be observed that consumer confidence lagged behind growth forecasts during the
downturns of 1998 and 2008, and the upturn of 2012. Although both the forecast and
consumer confidence went up in 2003, the increase in consumer confidence appears to be
more modest. Since the scales are different, it is not easy to compare the volatility of the
series just by looking at Figure 1. Therefore, we calculated the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by the mean) of each series, which is 0.52 for the Consumer
Confidence Index, and 0.89 for the GDP growth forecasts. Thus, consistent with our
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assumption of inertia in voters’ expectations, consumer confidence is more stable than
GDP growth forecasts.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 lay out the analytical model. Section
4 presents the propositions and discusses the results. Sections 5 describes the data
and the empirical model, while Section 6 presents and discusses the empirical findings.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The economy consists of n consumer-voters and two consumer-politicians who could
be the running mayor and her challenger in Portuguese municipalities. Voters’ utility
depends on discounted period utility which, in turn, consists of additively-separable eco-
nomic utility from a function in consumption c (with the standard concavity properties)
and local public goods L as well as a political utility component (with weight α). θ
could be interpreted as the voter’s personal sympathy or ideological preference and is
uniformly distributed over the interval [-1,1]; z takes the values −1
2
, if government a
(say left wing) is in power, or 1
2
, if government b (say right wing) is in power. A voter
experiences a positive utility if her favourite party is in power; political utility is smaller
for more centrist voters. As we can see later on, voters base their voting decision on
prospective utility; more centrist voters may, therefore, be swayed to vote for the other
party, if they expect a higher economic utility from it. Here is the voters’ utility function:
U it =
∞∑
s=t
(βi)s−tEs[u(cs) + Lt + αθizs], i = 1, ..., n. (1)
There are only two parties (or possible coalitions) which are represented by an incumbent
(say, from party a, without limiting the generality of the analysis) and a challenger b who
run for office every alternate period. Their utility consists of economic utility (analogous
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to the voter’s utility) and an ego rent, if they are in office. Hence politicians are purely
opportunistic:
V jt =
∞∑
s=t
W js =
∞∑
s=t
(βj)s−tEs[u(cs) + Lt + IsXs], j = a, b; (2)
Ir =

1 if in power in period r;
0 otherwise.
Everybody’s expected consumption depends on after-tax income which deviates from
trend output y¯ subject to a period specific growth shock t. With y¯ normalised to 1,
trend output is given by t = ¯ = 1. ¯ also depicts the previous period output and values
below 1 capture a recession, those above 1 a boom. The tax rate is assumed to remain
unchanged in an election period.4
Ekt [ct] = E
k
t [(1− τ)ty¯] = Ekt [(1− τ)t], k = j, i. (3)
The provision of local public goods is obtained from the government budget constraint.
The government receives revenues depending on growth shock t and chooses the deficit
level Dt which is the only government instrument. The government has to repay previ-
ous period deficit Dt−1 at interest rate rt−1 which is exogenous though not necessarily
constant; it is known by everybody and does not change with the volume of the deficit
(reflecting the situation of Portuguese municipalities that are not allowed to incur large
debts). In addition, the magnitude of L is affected by government competence ηjt .
Lt = τt +Dt − (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 + ηjt . (4)
4 Increasing taxes in an election period is extremely unpopular. Increasing the provision of local
public goods is more effective than decreasing taxes. In addition, territorial subdivisions like Portuguese
municipalities often have limited influence on total tax revenue. Ignoring tax rate increases could also
be justified by making a formal argument as in Shi and Svensson (2006). They obtain the optimal tax
rate for the ”equilibrium without elections” and then use backward induction in the 2-period election
cycle to argue that the very same tax rate remains optimal.
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Today’s competence ηt is made up of i.i.d. shocks for this period as well as last period.
It captures the government’s efficiency which is not known by the government prior to
the local public goods provision. Shocks µjt are modelled as random variables with mean
0, distribution function F (µjt) = F (•) and density function f(µjt) = f(•) = F ′(•) which
is (weakly) monotonously increasing up to the mean.5 Here is the MA(1) process for
government competence:
ηjt = µ
j
t + µ
j
t−1. (5)
The timing of events is presented in Table 1. At the beginning of election period t, voters
and incumbent a observe the realisations of last period’s skills shock µat−1 and deficitDt−1.
In period t, the incumbent also observes the (estimate for the) growth shock t which
allows her to choose her optimal level for the deficit Dt, thereby providing quantity Lt of
local public goods. Voters observe Lt, but have to form (distorted) expectations about
the growth shock, ̂t, and the incumbent’s optimal level for the deficit, D̂t because they
exhibit belief inertia (which is discussed further down; see equations 13 and 14). On
this basis, they determine their expectations of skills shock, µ̂at , which would influence
the provision of local public goods in (t + 1), if the incumbent were re-elected. Voters
are prospective in that they base their voting decision in period t on a comparison of
utilities to be expected from the incumbent and challenger in period (t + 1). Note that
voters can make a mistake in their expectation of the incumbent’s competence in (t+ 1)
because of two forms of inertia: (i) they do not fully anticipate the deficit policy by the
incumbent; and (ii) they do not fully anticipate an economic slump or boom.
In period (t + 1), the winner of the election receives ego rent X. Policy in (t + 1) is no
longer dependent on voting though; hence either policymaker will repay the costly deficit
5 For more unusual density functions (for instance, with F ′′(µat ) < 0 for some µ
a
t ≤ 0), we could get
ambiguous results. However, the limiting case of F ′′(µat ) = 0 for some µ
a
t ≤ 0 or even over the entire
range (uniform distribution) is acceptable.
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and cut the provision of local public goods. Voters anticipate this, but cannot prevent
it. Note also that the voting decision in election period t does not encompass concerns
for expected utility in t+ 2 because the MA(1) nature of the competence process makes
incumbent and challenger indistinguishable then. Policymakers do also not include t+ 2
in their decision problem for choosing the optimal level of Dt because they cannot affect
their own utility or re-election chances in t + 2. Hence the model can be split into 2-
period cycles, each consisting of an election period (period t) and an off-election period
(period t+ 1).
TABLE 1: The Timing of Events
Voters and incumbent a Voters:
observe: The winner of the period t
- last period’s deficit - observe local public goods elections takes office and
Dt−i Lt receives an ego rent.
- the incumbent’s last period skills - form expectations of the incumbent’s
µαt−1 current period skills
µ̂αt The winner repays the
Incumbent a: (because they are inert-rational and deficit of the previous
- observes growth (estimate) have beliefs on expected growth period.
t ̂t
- chooses deficit and expected deficit
Dt D̂t )
- and provides local public goods - and vote.
Lt.
Period t Period t+1
3 Model Solution
The model is solved by maximising the incumbent a’s expected utility in t and (t + 1)
which depends, for (t + 1), on the incumbent’s chance of winning the election which,
in turn, depends on all individuals’ probability of voting for incumbent a. The logic
of the solution is explained here and details are provided in the appendix. Voters are
prospective in that they vote for the politician who they expect to deliver a higher utility
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for them after the elections.6 Any voter i expects average skills from the challenger
(ηbt+1 = 0), but has some idea about the incumbent’s skills (η
a
t+1 = µ
a
t + µ
a
t+1) because
the incumbent’s fiscal policy choice in period t influences voter i’s expectations of the
incumbent’s current period skills shock Eit [µ
a
t ]. In Appendix A it is derived (and that is,
in our view, close to reality) that a voter will vote for the incumbent, either if ideologies
coincide and the challenger is not likely to do a better job (Eit [µ
a
t ] ≥ Eit [µbt ] = 0) or if
the voter’s (positive) perception of government competence makes up for the ”wrong”
ideological orientation of the incumbent:
Eit [µ
a
t ] > αθ
i. (6)
The incumbents’ probability of winning can then be obtained as:
Prob
{
[
Eit [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
. (7)
The competence extraction mechanism, i.e. how a voter obtains Eit [µ
a
t ], is shown in
Appendix B. The basis is the government’s budget constraint (4), here solved for µat :
µat = Lt − τt −Dt + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1. (8)
Knowing the provision of local public goods, output growth and the government’s deficit
decision (plus the tax rate, debt repayment, and previous period skills) true competence
could be inferred. Voters can observe the provision of public goods, but do not know
output growth and the government’s deficit choice. Their perception of government
6 Prospective voting should not be confused with rational expectations. In this paper, expected com-
petence is influenced by voters’ subjective beliefs, i.e. not based on rational expectations. Prospective
voters only use their expectations of competence for evaluating the future consequence of their votes;
there is no additional information about candidates because they are purely opportunistic.
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competence µ̂at is, therefore:
Et[µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = Lt − τ ̂t − D̂t + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1
= Lt − τt −Dt + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µat from (8)
+[τ(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t];
Et[µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = µ
a
t + [τ(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]. (9)
Note that voters credit the government with above average competence (µ̂at > 0), if the
government can increase the deficit by more than what is expected by voters (Dt− D̂t >
0). This is the standard manipulation argument. However, if they underestimate a
recession (t < ̂t < 0), they believe in lower competence. We can now rewrite the
incumbents’ probability of winning:
Probwin = Prob
{
[
µat + [τ(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
(10)
= Prob
{
µat ≥ [τ(̂t − t)] + [D̂t −Dt]
}
(11)
= 1 − F [τ(̂t − t) + D̂t −Dt]. (12)
If voters were modelled to have rational expectations, the probability of winning could
not be affected by government manipulations in equilibrium, a result that is contradicted
by evidence presented by, for instance, Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011), Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya (2004), and de Haan and Klomp (2013b). Proposition 1 confirms this
finding. This is, however, only possible, if the right hand side in the brace of equation
(11) (i.e. the argument of the F function in equation 12) becomes smaller than zero.
This happens if we incorporate in the model an important behavioural trait that we find
in the real world; voters exhibit belief inertia, but are otherwise quite sensible.
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Such inert-rational voters could be described as follows:
Eit [t] = ̂t = φ¯+ (1− φ)t, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, for all i. (13)
Eit [Dt] = D̂t = D¯ + γτ(¯− ̂t), 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, for all i. (14)
Parameter φ captures voter growth perception inertia, i.e. to what degree voters foresee
actual growth relative to growth of the previous period. D¯ depicts some kind of average
of deficits in previous periods and is part of the deficit inertia. The overall expected
government deficit is then adjusted by the expected revenue shortfall. Parameter γ < 1
depicts the deficit adjustment inertia. For γ < 1, this adjustment is incomplete, i.e.
there is additional belief inertia in the voter’s expected deficit. Note that, in contrast,
the government chooses the deficit and does not suffer from belief inertia about growth.7
Inserting equations (13) and (14) into (12) (see Appendix B) delivers
Probwin = 1 − F [τ ((1− γ)φ+ γ) (¯− t) + D¯ − Dt]. (15)
Here, we can see why the manipulation can increase the winning probability. If growth
remains unchanged (¯ = t), it suffices for the government to choose Dt > D¯ in order
raise re-election chances. In case of a boom, this becomes easier; in case of a recession,
more difficult.
Hence, the incumbent a’s decision problem can be simplified as follows (see Appendix
C for details; discount factor β can be ignored because it does not affect the qualitative
7 Obviously, this is a simplification. The idea is that governments have access to growth forecasts
which are used because they give them an unbiased prediction of actual growth (whereas voters are
not fully aware of such forecasts or do not fully incorporate them in their planning). In the empirical
model, we assume that the local government uses estimated regional growth forecasts (based on national
forecasts obtained externally from the IMF). We can even show that deviations of forecasted and actual
ex post growth rates do not significantly affect the government’s choice of deficit (see the first set of
results of Table E.3 in Appendix E).
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properties of the model):
maxDt V
a
t = maxDt V = maxDt W
a
t + W
a
t+1
= maxDt u((1− τ)t) + Lt +X
+ u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1 + Probwin X. (16)
where
Lt = τt +Dt − (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 + ηjt ;
Lt+1 = τt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt + ηjt+1.
The first order condition (FOC) is:
1 − (1 + rt) + F ′[τ ((1− γ)φ+ γ) (¯− t) + D¯ − D∗t ] X = 0
⇔ rt = F ′[•] X. (17)
Since the second order condition for a maximum holds, the first order condition (FOC)
fully characterises the optimal deficit choice D∗t by the government. The FOC is straight-
forward: the marginal loss from a deficit, i.e. the interest rate, must equal the marginal
gain, i.e. the marginal increase in the (winning) chance for obtaining the ego rent. In
other words, the government benefits from raising the deficit because it can impress upon
voters that it is more competent and, thereby, raise its re-election chances so that it is
more likely to enjoy the perks from staying in office.
Having confirmed the existence of a budget cycle, our main interest turns to studying
the effect of a perturbation of t on D
∗
t , i.e. the change in government manipulation,
if a recession is looming in an election year. Note that t is the actual recession which
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is, however, expected by the government. Furthermore, we are interested in how the
government’s optimal deficit response to a recession is influenced by the voters’ growth
perception inertia φ and deficit adjustment inertia γ. Some additional straightforward
results are reported in Appendix D.
4 Propositions and Discussion
Before looking at perturbation results, we can confirm that the political budget cycle
also leads to increased winning chances:
Proposition 1. - Re-election Chances.
The incumbent’s fiscal manipulations are effective; the incumbent’s vote share can be
increased.
Proof: Simple inspection of equations (12) and (15); see also discussion thereof below
the aforementioned equations on pages 9 and 10.
The proposition is supported by empirical findings by, for instance, Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya (2004), Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011), and de Haan and Klomp (2013b) who
argue that government manipulations do indeed positively affect re-election chances. In
addition, Boylan (2008) and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) find evidence that government
manipulations increase if the election is closely contested, what Boylan calls a ”close
election bias”. The next proposition suggests yet another reason for the incumbent to
increase the magnitude of her manipulations.
Proposition 2. - Recession (or Boom) Expectations.
Imminent recession expectations (lower t in equation 16) increase the government’s
optimal deficit at the equilibrium, albeit underproportionally. (Analogously, boom ex-
pectations decrease optimal deficits, albeit, again, underproportionally.) Hence, there is
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a countercyclical policy effect.
0 ≥ dDt
∗
dt
= −τ((1− γ)φ+ γ) > −1.
Proof: Appendix D.
Proposition 2 states the core result of the paper. If the incumbent government perceives
an economic downturn, it expects lower revenues and will adjust its expenditures in order
to limit its expected (costly) deficit. So, the deficit will not go up one-for-one with the
revenue shortfall. Hence the ”> −1” in the proposition. However, the government will
not cut expenditures (for local public goods) one-for-one either, unless voters equally
adjust their expectations. Hence the ”0 ≥” in the proposition. Here is the reason.
With voter growth perception inertia (φ > 0), a reduction in growth is perceived, but
underestimated. As a consequence, voters will attribute cuts in expenditures, at least
partially, to government incompetence rather than the dire economic conditions. As a
consequence, the government cannot cut expenditures one-for-one, if it does not want to
damage its re-election chances too much. Higher growth perception inertia (higher φ)
implies more government manipulation.
Voters’ deficit adjustment inertia (γ < 1) works in the opposite direction and partially
offsets the growth perception inertia effect. If voters think that the recession only has
a limited effect on the deficit (high deficit inertia, i.e. low γ), they underestimate the
deficit. Hence they attribute a better provision of local public goods to competence
(rather than an increase in the deficit), which raises the incumbent’s re-election chances.
As a consequence, the government tends to limit its deficit in order to contain repayment
costs. Higher deficit adjustment inertia (lower γ) implies less government manipulation.
This intuition is formalised in Corrolary 1.
Corollary 1. - Voter Inertia.
The countercyclical policy effect in Proposition 2 is increased when the voter growth
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perception inertia goes up (φ up), but decreased when the voter deficit adjustment
inertia goes up (γ down).
(i)
ddDt
∗
dt
dφ
= −τ(1− γ) < 0; (18)
(ii)
ddDt
∗
dt
dγ
= −τ(1− φ) < 0. (19)
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 2.
The main countercyclicality8 result would only vanish under a very unlikely scenario;
voters would have to show minimal growth perception inertia (φ = 0) and maximal deficit
adjustment inertia (γ = 0), i.e. they would have to be able to foresee the recession 100%,
but would believe that this has absolutely no effect on the deficit. If either condition is
violated, the countercyclicality result holds.
5 Data, Institutional Setting, and Empirical Model
The implications of the theoretical model are tested using financial, economic and po-
litical data for the 308 Portuguese municipalities. Local finance data was obtained from
the Portuguese Directorate General of Local Authorities (DGAL), information regarding
local elections and mayors from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and demographic and
economic data from the National Statistics Institute (INE). Actual GDP data and GDP
forecasts are not available at the municipal level (NUTS IV level); so we go to the second
lowest level of disaggregation, the NUTS III level, whenever possible.9
8 Note that countercyclicality refers to higher spending (for instance, on local public goods) during
recessionary periods. It does not capture the Keynesian idea of stimulating the economy. If this were
included in the model, the government’s manipulation incentive would actually be augmented and the
countercyclicality result would be even stronger.
9 NUTS is the European Union nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided
into three NUTS I regions (Mainland, Azores and Madeira), seven NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS III
regions. Each NUTS III region aggregates several municipalities, which correspond to the NUTS IV
level.
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Actual GDP data is available at the NUTS III level from 1991. Given that there are
no GDP growth rate forecasts at neither the municipal nor the regional levels, we use
the 1-year-ahead forecasts from the October issues of the IMF’s World Economic Out-
look (WEO), released shortly before the municipalities must approve their budgets for
the following year. In order to obtain 1-year-ahead forecasts at the regional level, we
estimate ARIMAX(1,0,1), i.e. ARMAX(1,1)10, models for the NUTS III GDP growth
rate forecasts, employing the IMF’s national GDP growth forecast as an explanatory
variable. These estimated regional GDP growth forecasts are used as a proxy for the
mayors’ growth expectations in their regions because they incorporate national GDP
forecasts while accounting for regional economic conditions. The ARMAX(1,1) model
estimated for each region’s GDP growth forecast can be summarized as follows:
Forect = α0 + α1Forect−1 + α2NatForect + ζt + α3ζt−1, (20)
where Forect is the real GDP growth forecast for the region under analysis for year t,
NatForect is the national real GDP growth forecast for year t (obtained from the IMF’s
WEO), and ζt is a white noise error term.
Institutional Setting
The Portuguese municipalities were formally established by the 1976 Constitution, which
followed the bloodless military coup of 25 April, 1974. Local election dates are fixed
exogenously from the perspective of the municipalities and they take place in all of them
at the same time. The first municipal elections were held in December 1976. Since then,
there were elections every three years until 1985, and every four years thereafter (in
December until 2001, and in October since then). Other elections were never held at
the same time; although local elections sometimes occurred in the same year as national
elections, they were always at least three months apart.
10 Since regional growth rates were found to be stationary, there is no need to take first-differences of
the series.
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Municipalities are governed by the Town Council (Caˆmara Municipal), which holds the
executive power, and by the Municipal Assembly, which holds the deliberative power
and approves the municipal budgets and plans of activities. The members of both cham-
bers are elected directly by citizens, who vote in closed party or independent lists of
candidates. The top candidate of the list receiving most votes for the Town Council
becomes the mayor, presides that chamber and plays a leading role in the executive,
having substantial power and autonomy.
The municipal budget is drafted by the mayor’s team, is analysed by the Town Council,
and finally approved by the Municipal Assembly. A mayor will have a larger margin of
maneuver regarding the budget when her party holds a majority of deputies in both the
Town Council and the Municipal Assembly. As shown in the descriptive statistics (Table
E.1 in Appendix E), this happens in 75% of the cases, implying that the approval of the
municipal budget is generally easy. Thus, in practice, the mayor plays a decisive role in
local fiscal policy.
All Portuguese municipalities are subject to the same laws and regulations, and have the
same responsibilities. Regarding public service provision, they are responsible for sewage,
the distribution of water, local transportation and communication, basic schooling, prop-
erty maintenance, promotion of culture and science, recreation and sports facilities, local
health care, social housing, environmental protection, and municipal policing. Munici-
palities are financially autonomous in the sense of being able to elaborate and approve
their own budgets without needing approval from a higher-ranked authority. But, for
the large majority of municipalities, most revenues come from grants from the central
government or from the European Union. In fact, own revenues account, on average,
for just one third of total effective revenues (excluding loans), while formula-related (un-
conditional) grants from the central government account for roughly 40 percent, and
other transfers from the central government or from the European Union account for the
remaining 27 percent.
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Municipalities are allowed to run deficits, but the law which regulates municipal finances
imposes limits to deficits and to the stock of gross debt. A municipality whose debt
is above the legal limit is obliged to reduce the excess debt by 10 percent each year.
Excessive debt accumulation is typically not a problem for municipalities; currently only
20 out of the 308 have to submit to a formal debt reduction regime.
Empirical Model
According to our theoretical model presented above (Proposition 2), expected recessions
in election years create incentives to generate higher budget deficits. That is, in an
election year, mayors will be unwilling to counter the negative effects of a recession on
the budget balance by sufficiently raising revenues (through higher local taxes and fees)
or cutting expenditures (lowering the level of local public goods provision), which results
in higher deficits. This does not necessarily happen in off-election years, when mayors
can behave in a more responsible (less opportunistic) manner. These implications are
tested with the following empirical model:
Di,t = β1ElYi,t + β2Recessi,t + β3(ElY ∗Recess)i,t + X′i,tω + νi + σt + ξi,t, (21)
whereDi,t is the budget deficit of municipality i in year t in real euros (of 2015) per capita;
ElYi,t is a dummy variable that equals one in municipal election years, and zero otherwise;
Recessi,t is our expected recession variable, based on the forecast of GDP growth for
year t in the region to which municipality i belongs; Xi,t is a vector of control variables
which may affect budget balances; νi represents unobserved municipality-specific effects;
σt represents time-specific effects; and ξi,t is the error term.11
Our expected recession variable, Recessi,t, based on the estimated forecasts of the re-
gional real GDP growth rate obtained in the ARMAX models of equation (20), is defined
11 Since the election-year dummy would be collinear with yearly dummy variables, we control for time
effects using a cubic time trend. In robustness tests, we also use 4-year mandate dummies and 5-year
period dummies.
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in four alternative ways: (1) the forecast itself, Foreci,t, with negative values correspond-
ing to expected recessions; (2) a recession dummy variable which takes the value of one
when a negative growth rate is forecasted, and equals zero otherwise; (3) two dummy
variables for unusually low growth, which equal one when the forecasted rate of real GDP
growth is below the 25th or 33rd percentiles, respectively, of the past values of regional
real GDP growth. Recessi,t is interacted with ElYi,t, so that we can check if the effects
of expected recessions in election years are different from those in the other years of the
electoral cycle.
Given the theoretical model and the evidence of PBCs in Portuguese municipalities
shown in previous studies (e.g., Aidt, Veiga and Veiga 2011, Veiga and Veiga 2007),
we expect a positive β1, consistent with higher deficits in election years. Furthermore,
an expected recession for an election year leads to a higher deficit according to our
theoretical model. Therefore, a negative β3 is expected when our expected recession
variable is the forecasted growth rate (expected lower growth rates lead to higher deficits),
and a positive β3 is expected when Recessi,t corresponds to the dummies for negative
growth or for unusually low growth rates (expected recessions lead to higher deficits).
The overall election-year effect on the budget balance is given by (β1 + β3).
The vector Xi,t includes a set of control variables which may affect budget balances.
These are related to demographics (shares of younger and older people, and population
density), the structure of municipal expenditures and revenues (shares of investment
expenditures and of own revenues), the ideological orientation and the experience (years
in office) of the mayor, and whether or not the mayor’s party holds a majority in both
the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly. Descriptive statistics of the variables
used in this paper are presented in Appendix E (Table E.1).
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6 Empirical Results
The baseline empirical model of equation (21) is estimated for a panel of 308 Portuguese
municipalities, with data from 1992 to 2014, using the fixed effects (within) estimator,
with standard errors clustered by municipality. The results for the entire sample are re-
ported in Table 2. Each column shows the results obtained for each of the four definitions
of the Recessi,t variable.
The election year dummy variable is always statistically significant with a positive sign,
indicating that there is a tendency for higher deficits in election years which can be
specified in terms of real euros per capita (base year 2015). Concretely, the budget
deficit increases by between 27.8 and 39.4 euros per capita in election years relative
to off-election years. These results confirm those of Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) and
Veiga and Veiga (2007) regarding the existence of PBCs in Portuguese municipalities.
The interaction of the forecast variable with the election year dummy has always the
expected sign, but is only statistically significant in columns 1 and 2, that is, when we
use the forecast itself or a recession dummy. As expected, and in accordance with the
theoretical model, an expected recession leads to an even higher deficit in an election
year.
The results obtained when using our expected recession dummy (column 2), for instance,
indicate that a recession in an election year increases the deficit by an additional amount
of 24.3 euros per capita. Thus, the overall increase in the deficit in an election year is
52.6 (=28.3+24.3) euros per capita when there is a recession at the same time. The effect
of a recession in an off-election year is negative; looking at column 2 again, the deficit is
reduced by 18.5 euros per capita, which means that the municipality implements a more
conservative fiscal policy. However, the overall effect of a recession in an election year is
positive (5.8 = – 18.5 + 24.3 euros per capita).
Regarding the control variables, there is weak evidence that a greater share of population
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TABLE 2: Countercyclicality in PBCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Growth Forecast Recession Dummy Forecast<25th perc. Forecast<33rd perc.
of GDP growth of GDP growth
Election year 39.367*** 28.335*** 30.435*** 27.836***
(7.562) (5.873) (5.889) (4.940)
Recession 4.060*** -18.532*** -11.051** -11.630**
(4.244) (-3.219) (-2.177) (-2.583)
Election year * Recession -3.877* 24.321** 10.261 13.125
(-1.893) (2.414) (1.070) (1.512)
%Population < 15 -3.394* -3.768* -3.853* -3.743*
(-1.696) (-1.841) (-1.901) (-1.845)
%Population > 65 -2.947 -2.788 -2.998 -3.048
(-1.428) (-1.344) (-1.447) (-1.472)
Population density 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(4.537) (4.134) (4.322) (4.361)
Investment Expend. (%Total) 4.253*** 4.255*** 4.261*** 4.264***
(13.865) (13.823) (13.850) (13.867)
Own Revenue (%Total) 0.824* 0.847* 0.880* 0.895*
(1.660) (1.708) (1.750) (1.799)
Mayor left -17.544** -17.886** -17.844** -17.771**
(-2.474) (-2.513) (-2.503) (-2.495)
Mayor independent 17.856 17.055 18.329 17.871
(0.626) (0.602) (0.646) (0.630)
Years mayor -0.544 -0.540 -0.553 -0.571
(-1.444) (-1.411) (-1.470) (-1.528)
Majority 0.933 1.186 1.067 1.033
(0.177) (0.225) (0.203) (0.196)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R-squared 0.119 0.118 0.117 0.117
Number of municipalities 308 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality. Recession variable defined as indicated in
the respective column title. Time effects controlled for with a cubic time trend. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
under 15 is associated with lower deficits, while the share of elderly citizens does not seem
to have significant effects. Greater population density seems to lead to higher deficits,
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eventually due to costs of congestion. Higher shares of investment expenditures are also
associated with higher deficits. The reason may be that an accumulation of medium and
long-term debt is only allowed for funding investment expenditures according to the local
finance law. There is weak evidence that a higher share of own revenues is also related
to higher deficits. This somewhat unexpected result may arise from a higher exposure
of these municipalities’ finances to the business cycle, implying that revenues are more
variable than in municipalities that can rely more on (stable) government transfers. The
results also indicate that left-wing mayors produce lower deficits than their right-wing
counterparts.12 Finally, mayors’ time in office and holding a majority in both the Town
Council and Municipal Assembly do not seem to affect budget balances.
Overall, the results of Table 2 provide some evidence for the implications of our theo-
retical model, as the interaction of the election year dummy with the expected recession
variable is statistically significant in the first two estimations. Stronger results may
not have been obtained because the bulk of revenues of many municipalities consists of
grants from the central government. Formula-determined (unconditional) grants depend
on the main tax revenues of the central government (personal and corporate income
taxes, and VAT) in the previous year, not being affected by the current year’s economic
situation. Therefore, a recession is expected to have smaller effects on the finances of
a municipality highly dependent on unconditional grants than on one that relies more
on own revenues and conditional (project-related) grants. This implies that the results
should be stronger if we exclude from the sample the municipalities that rely heavily on
unconditional grants.
12 Veiga and Veiga (2007) obtained a similar result. Although the purpose of the present paper is
not to explain partisan differences in deficits, we checked whether smaller deficits by left-wing mayors
could be caused by greater transfers from the central government (because there was a prevalence of
left-wing national governments during the sample period). This does not seem to have happened, as
average transfers for left and right-wing municipalities were very similar, with a slightly higher amount
given to the latter. This applies to both election and off-election years. Party similarity between the
mayor and the prime-minister does not seem to have mattered either.
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Table 3 reports the results obtained when the sample is composed only of the munic-
ipalities whose revenues from formula-related (unconditional) grants account for less
than 50% of total revenues. Again, there is evidence of PBCs, as the election year
dummy is positive and statistically significant. Now, the interaction of the expected
recession variable with the election year dummy is always statistically significant, with
the expected sign. Thus, as predicted by the theoretical model, an expected recession
(negative growth) or unusually low growth (below the 25th or 33rd percentiles of past
growth rates) lead to higher deficits in elections years. The results for the control vari-
ables are very similar to those of Table 2; the share of own revenues in total revenues
(excluding loans) is no longer statistically significant because municipalities with large
grants from the central government were thrown out of the sample; one component of
the dependency ratio (population under 15) is no longer significant whereas another one
(senior population) now (weakly) is.
The robustness of the empirical results is checked by implementing several specification
changes. First, the control variables of vector Xi,t were excluded. Second and third,
time-specific effects were controlled for in two alternative ways: with mandate dummies
(one for each 4-year term), and with 5-year period dummies. Forth, the 30 municipalities
of the islands of Azores and Madeira were excluded, so that we worked with an, arguably,
more homogeneous dataset of 278 mainland municipalities. As shown in Appendix E
(Table E.2) the results regarding the election year dummy variable and its interaction
with the expected recession variable remain qualitatively and robustly the same. That
is, the results of the robustness tests are consistent with the existence of Political Budget
Cycles and with our theoretical model’s conclusion that an expected recession leads to
even higher election-year deficits.
We do several additional empirical tests. We check if deviations of the forecasted growth
rate from the actual one affect the local government’s choice of deficits. As shown in
Appendix E (first panel of Table E.3), it does not; the difference of the two is never
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TABLE 3: Countercyclicality in PBCs (Grants<50% of Revenues)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Growth Forecast Recession Dummy Forecast<25th perc. Forecast<33rd perc.
of GDP growth of GDP growth
Election year 35.330*** 19.425*** 19.900*** 18.917***
(6.225) (4.740) (4.581) (3.924)
Recession 2.932*** -20.983*** -13.345*** -10.682***
(3.480) (-3.749) (-2.825) (-2.629)
Election year * Recession -4.954** 35.866*** 23.883** 13.734*
(-2.135) (3.549) (2.442) (2.339)
%Population < 15 1.680 1.331 1.406 1.519
(0.994) (0.764) (0.828) (0.901)
%Population > 65 -5.017* -4.933* -4.920* -4.930*
(-1.688) (-1.663) (-1.659) (-1.658)
Population density 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048***
(4.124) (3.885) (4.047) (4.095)
Investment Expend. (%Total) 3.366*** 3.355*** 3.372*** 3.381***
(11.976) (11.997) (11.984) (12.002)
Own Revenue (%Total) -0.065 -0.102 -0.069 -0.022
(-0.131) (-0.210) (-0.137) (-0.044)
Mayor left -18.361*** -18.066*** -18.240*** -18.510***
(-2.648) (-2.603) (-2.598) (-2.653)
Mayor independent -17.720 -17.721 -16.934 -17.714
(-0.687) (-0.703) (-0.655) (-0.685)
Years mayor -0.225 -0.210 -0.238 -0.249
(-0.649) (-0.598) (-0.689) (-0.724)
Majority 6.448 6.943 6.629 6.516
(1.252) (1.342) (1.298) (1.277)
Observations 5,009 5,009 5,009 5,009
R-squared 0.126 0.128 0.125 0.125
Number of municipalities 308 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality. Recession variable defined as indicated in
the respective column title. Time effects controlled for with a cubic time trend. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
statistically significant. Furthermore, the theoretical model implies that greater deficits
in election-year recessions must be caused by a shortfall of revenues if governments are
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unwilling to increase taxes or reduce public goods provision in election years. The results
for total revenues (excluding loans) and for planned revenues (from the initial munici-
pal budget) are also consistent with the model; the coefficient of the interaction of the
election year dummy with the expected recession variable always has the expected sign
and is statistically significant in all but one estimation (see Apendix E, second and third
panels of Table E.3); in election years, forecasted negative growth or growth rates clearly
below normal have the expected negative effect on revenues. Finally, we also analysed
the behaviour of municipal expenditures. The results shown in the last panel of Table
E.3 are consistent with those of previous papers (e.g., Aidt, Veiga and Veiga 2011, and
Veiga and Veiga 2007) that found evidence of PBCs in the expenditures of Portuguese
municipalities, since the coefficient for the election year dummy is always positive and
statistically significant. Additionally, expected negative or unusually low growth in elec-
tion years leads to even greater increases in municipal expenditures. Therefore, the
positive effects of recessions in election-year municipal deficits seems to be due to the
combination of reductions in revenues and increases in expenditures.
7 Conclusion
Our theoretical model captures the impact of recessions (and booms) on the political
budget cycle. Even in a recession, budget manipulations allow the incumbent to increase
her re-election chances. This is, however, only possible if manipulations in recessions go
beyond the manipulations an incumbent employs in ordinary times. Belief inertia is
what produces these results. If voters lag behind politicians in the perception of a
growth decline, they judge the reduction in the provision of public goods more harshly,
i.e. attribute a lower level of competence to the incumbent, which reduces her re-election
chances. There is a partially offsetting effect, if voters do not fully adjust their expecta-
tions of the necessary increase in deficit due to the recession. A lower perception of the
24
deficit amounts to a hidden effort by the government; the increased level of the public
goods provision is attributed to government competence.
The empirical results obtained for a sample comprising all 308 Portuguese municipali-
ties, from 1992 to 2014, provide evidence for the core finding of the theoretical model;
fiscal manipulations increase in recessions and decrease in booms. This amounts to
countercyclical policy, all for the wrong reason of opportunistic behaviour rather than
Keynesian stabilisation policy. In particular, we find evidence in an array of regression
specifications that deficits go up in election years far beyond normal manipulations when
there is a recession or unusually low growth; in an election year, revenues are lower and
expenditures are higher when there is a recession compared to other election years.
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For Online Publication:
Appendix and Indications for the Referees
The appendix presents indications for the model solution in Section 3 and for the deriva-
tion of the propositions in Section 4. It also presents additional analytical results, de-
scriptive statistics and additional empirical results.
A Probability of an individual to vote for the incumbent
First, we consider an individual who votes prospectively, i.e. she would prefer the politi-
cian who can deliver the highest level of expected overall utility in (t + 1). It consists
of utility from consumption, utility from the provision of local public goods, and utility
from the ideological alignment with the politician. She votes for incumbent a, if
Et[u(c
a
t+1) + L
a
t+1 + αθ
i(−1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when a in power
> Et[u(c
b
t+1) + L
b
t+1 + αθ
i(+
1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when b in power
. (A.1)
Obviously, voters differ in their preference for party a and b. Expected consumption
is identical for both politicians, whereas the expected provision of local public goods is
affected by the policymakers’ competence and individuals’ expectations thereof:
Eit [u(c
a
t+1)] = E
i
t [u(c
b
t+1)] = E
i
t [u((1− τ)t+1)]; (A.2)
Eit [L
j
t+1] = E
i
t [τt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt + ηjt+1], j = a, b. (A.3)
Equation (A.3) says that voters base their expectation of the provision of public goods
in period (t+ 1) on their belief of tax revenue in (t+ 1). The period t deficit is repaid in
period (t+1) because it is costly. The policymaker will try not to borrow in period (t+1)
because there is no election at the end of that period and a non-balanced budget carries
a repayment cost. Individuals have no idea about the skills shock of either potential
policymaker in t + 1. Nor do they know the skills shock of the challenger in period t,
and, therefore, expect 0. However, they can use the incumbent’s period t fiscal policy to
draw conclusions about her skills shock in period t. The expected level of local public
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goods of the challenger differs from what is know of the incumbent:
Et[L
b
t+1] = Et[τt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt]; (A.4)
Et[L
a
t+1] = Et[τt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt] + Et[µat ]. (A.5)
Combining equations (A.1) to (A.5) we can obtain a condition for an individual to vote
for incumbent a (which corresponds to condition (6) in the main text):
Et[µ
a
t ] > αθ
i. (A.6)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determine the probability (Pr) of any
voter to vote for incumbent a:
Pr[Et[µ
a
t ]− αθi ≥ 0] =
Et[µ
a
t ]− (−α)
α− (−α) =
Et[µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
. (A.7)
B Probability of the incumbent to win
Now, we can determine the probability Prob that incumbent a obtains 50% of the votes
in the period t elections. It is the probability that mass 1 of voters, i.e. all voters, times
their individual probability Pr to vote for incumbent a (as determined in equation A.7)
is greater or equal to 1
2
. The probability for the incumbent to win the election – equation
(7) in the main text – is repeated here:
Prob
{
[
Et[µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
(B.1)
Competence extraction mechanism: Voters’ expectation of government competence µat
can be obtained by studying the voters’ perception of the government budget constraint
(4) from the main text which is repeated here (with equation 5 inserted):
Lt = τt +Dt − (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 + µat + µat−1. (B.2)
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The true competence is:
µat = Lt − τt −Dt + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1. (B.3)
Voters can observe the level of local public goods Lt, previous period deficit Dt−1, pre-
vious period competence µat−1, interest rate rt−1 and the tax rate τ . Their perception of
government competence is, however, also affected by their expectation of growth and the
government deficit policy (which can be concealed, for instance, by using special govern-
ment funds and accounting tricks). Hence we obtain what corresponds to equation (9)
in the main text:
Et[µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = Lt − τ ̂t − D̂t + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1
= Lt − τt −Dt + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µat from (8) or (B.3)
+[τ(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t];
Et[µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = µ
a
t + [τ(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]. (B.4)
Hence the incumbents’ probability of winning becomes (equations 10 to 12 in the main
text):
Probwin = Prob
{
[
µat + [τ(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
= Prob
{
µat ≥ [τ(̂t − t)] + [D̂t −Dt]
}
(B.5)
= 1 − F [τ(̂t − t) + D̂t −Dt], (B.6)
where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock.
The marked area towards the right (light grey or yellow [if in colour]) under the density
function depicted in Figure B.1 corresponds to the probability described by equation
(B.5) and by the distribution function representation in equation (B.6). Expected com-
petence overall is greater than actual competence, if, in case of a recession, the govern-
ment’s deficit makes up for the voters’ underestimation of the shortfall in tax revenue
(τ(̂t − t) < 0), plus the voters’ expected deficit D̂t (deficit bias). Then the probability
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Figure B.1: Bell-shaped competence density function as an example
(see equation (B.6) or the light grey [or yellow] area under the density function) is always
greater than 1
2
and the government’s chance to be re-elected is increased. The compe-
tence perception of voters would also be increased, if voters fully knew of and believed
in the forecasted recession or did not have a deficit bias.
Inert-rational voters are described in equations (13) and (14) in the main text which are
reproduced here:
Eit [t] = ̂t = φ¯+ (1− φ)t, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, for all i. (B.7)
Eit [Dt] = D̂t = D¯ + γτ(¯− ̂t), 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, for all i. (B.8)
On this basis, we can derive equation (15) in the main text:
Probwin = 1 − F [τ (̂t − t)] + [D¯ + γτ(¯− ̂t)−Dt],
= 1 − F [τ ((1− γ)̂t + γ¯ − t) + D¯ − Dt],
= 1 − F [τ ((1− γ) (φ¯+ (1− φ)t) + γ¯ − t) + D¯ − Dt],
= 1 − F [τ ((1− γ)φ+ γ) (¯− t) + D¯ − Dt]. (B.9)
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C The incumbent’s maximisation problem
Prior to elections, incumbent a would like to maximise her utility over periods t and
(t + 1) by choosing Dt (see the timing of events on page 6). Period (t + 1) utility is
the sum of the utilities for winning and losing the election weighted by the probability
determined previously. Hence, incumbent a’s decision problem:
maxDt V
a
t = maxDt V = maxDt W
a
t + W
a
t+1
= maxDt E
a
t { u((1− τ)t) + Lt +X }
+ Eat { Probwin [u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1 +X] }
+ Eat { (1− Probwin) [u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1] } (C.1)
= maxDt u((1− τ)t) + Lt +X
+ u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1 + Probwin X. (C.2)
where
Lt = τt +Dt − (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 + ηjt ;
Lt+1 = τt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt + ηjt+1
The first order condition (FOC) is:
1 − (1 + rt) + F ′[τ ((1− γ)φ+ γ) (¯− t) + D¯ − D∗t ] X = 0;
⇔ rt = F ′[•] X. (C.3)
The second order condition for a well-behaved maximisation problem is satisfied because
the manipulation pushes the critical value of the F function below mean 0 (see also
Footnote 5). So the FOC determines the government’s optimal deficit Dt
∗.
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D Perturbation results
The Implicit Function Theorem is used for obtaining perturbation results, both for
Proposition 2 in Section 4 and for the straightforward results referred to at the end
of Section 3.
Derivatives with respect to any variable x of the FOC around the optimal value Dt
∗
will be denoted
d dV
dDt
|Dt∗
dx
=: VDtx. The derivations of the marginal effect of changes in
exogenous variables on the equilibrium value of the government’s optimal choice of deficit
Dt
∗ are specified below.
For Proposition 2:
dDt
∗
dt
= − VDtt
VDtDt
= −τ ((1− γ)φ+ γ)F
′′[•]X
F ′′[•]X = −τ ((1− γ)φ+ γ) > −1. (D.1)
For the straightforward results referred to at the end of Section 3:
1. Government Cost Effect: Higher repayment costs rt reduce the optimal government
deficit at the equilibrium:
(i)
dDt
∗
drt
= − VDtrt
VDtDt
< 0. (D.2)
2. Government Benefit Effect: A higher ego rent X increases the optimal government
deficit at the equilibrium:
(ii)
dDt
∗
dX
= − VDtX
VDtDt
> 0. (D.3)
3. Leverage Effect: A higher tax rate τ decreases the optimal government deficit at the
equilibrium if there is a boom, but increases it in case of a recession:
(iii)
dDt
∗
dτ
= − VDtτ
VDtDt
< 0 if t > 0; (D.4)
(iv)
dDt
∗
dτ
= − VDtτ
VDtDt
> 0 if t < 0. (D.5)
As for part 1, if the cost of manipulating the government deficit increases, the government
will be more careful in expanding fiscal latitude in order to gain an electoral advantage.
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The effect of increasing the social costs of deficits is captured in the different setting of
the Shi and Svensson (2006) model, though not explicitly. As for part 2, the incumbent
is willing to increase the manipulation, if there is a larger benefit from being re-elected.
This implies that the government accepts additional costs of producing a deficit. Despite
the model differences, such an effect of ego rents on manipulations is also confirmed by
Shi and Svensson (2006). In part 3, as tax rate τ increases, the effect of an output
shock is magnified. If there is a recession (t < 0), the government optimally increases
the deficit in order to offset the loss in fiscal latitude; in case of a boom, the deficit
is reduced. This leverage effect is not captured in either Shi and Svensson (2006) or
Lohmann (1998).
E Descriptive Statistics and Additional Results
This subsection presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical
tests and some additional empirical results, including those of robustness checks.
TABLE E.1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Observations Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Deficit (real euros p.c.) 7,022 19.16 148.33 -1,301.34 3,955.61
Election year 7,022 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Forecast (regional) 7,022 1.45 2.31 -7.97 9.65
Recession Dummy 7,022 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Forecast<25th percentile 7,022 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Forecast<33th percentile 7,022 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
%Population < 15 7,022 14.95 3.28 4.84 32.45
%Population > 65 7,022 20.72 6.38 7.12 44.97
Population density 7,022 285.91 815.26 4.41 7,865.82
Investment Expenditure (%Total) 7,022 33.51 15.43 -63.27 94.93
Own Revenue (%Total Effective Revenue) 7,022 33.12 18.95 1.14 124.75
Mayor left 7,022 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mayor independent 7,022 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Years mayor 7,022 8.38 6.41 1.00 37.00
Majority 7,022 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Formula grants (%Effective Revenue) 7,022 40.87 14.69 4.59 124.93
Number of municipalities 308 308 308 308 308
Sources: DGAL, Ministry of Internal Affairs, INE, and IMF.
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TABLE E.2: Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Growth Forecast Recession Dummy Forecast<25th perc. Forecast<33rd perc.
of GDP growth of GDP growth
Without the control variables of vector X
Election year 42.696*** 25.649*** 26.507*** 25.729***
(7.188) (6.280) (6.167) (5.350)
Election year * Recession -5.135** 39.614*** 25.379** 20.773**
(-2.138) (3.788) (2.518) (2.339)
Observations 5,015 5,015 5,015 5,015
R-squared 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.037
Controlling for time effects with 4-year mandate dummies
Election year 41.871*** 29.401*** 30.214*** 29.422***
(7.084) (6.157) (6.109) (5.477)
Election year * Recession -3.699 28.680*** 18.250* 15.772*
(-1.630) (2.835) (1.966) (1.909)
Observations 5,009 5,009 5,009 5,009
R-squared 0.129 0.131 0.129 0.129
Controlling for time effects with 5-year period dummies
Election year 35.824*** 20.792*** 21.673*** 21.203***
(6.323) (4.906) (4.836) (4.232)
Election year * Recession -4.249* 37.385*** 23.647** 18.709**
(-1.855) (3.792) (2.473) (2.214)
Observations 5,009 5,009 5,009 5,009
R-squared 0.128 0.131 0.129 0.128
Excluding 30 municipalities of Azores and Madeira
Election year 37.983*** 19.927*** 20.351*** 19.520***
(6.430) (4.707) (4.551) (3.954)
Election year * Recession -6.786*** 36.101*** 23.983** 19.626**
(-2.662) (3.500) (2.387) (2.255)
Observations 4,557 4,557 4,557 4,557
R-squared 0.133 0.135 0.132 0.131
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality. Recession variable defined as indicated in
the respective column title. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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TABLE E.3: Additional Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Growth Forecast Recession Dummy Forecast<25th perc. Forecast<33rd perc.
of GDP growth of GDP growth
Deficits (Including the difference between forecasted and actual growth rates)
Election year 35.331*** 20.195*** 20.519*** 20.538***
(6.228) (4.907) (4.902) (4.685)
Election year*Recession -4.604** 34.320*** 27.511** 22.580**
(-2.012) (3.441) (2.520) (2.354)
GDP growth (forecast-actual) -0.582 -0.415 -0.468 -0.532
(-1.448) (-1.026) (-1.154) (-1.311)
Observations 5,009 5,009 5,009 5,009
R-squared 0.126 0.128 0.127 0.126
Total Revenues (excluding loans)
Election year 21.216*** 38.696*** 39.483*** 32.396***
(4.356) (6.629) (6.171) (4.939)
Election year*Recession 5.306** -35.329*** -31.965*** -11.611
(2.147) (-3.392) (-3.142) (-1.242)
Observations 4,726 4,726 4,726 4,726
R-squared 0.546 0.541 0.541 0.542
Planned Revenues (from the initial budgets)
Election year 25.627 77.360*** 79.561*** 76.442***
(1.618) (4.156) (4.223) (3.566)
Election year*Recession 14.718** -95.692*** -83.816*** -63.114**
(2.422) (-3.313) (-3.225) (-2.367)
Observations 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644
R-squared 0.360 0.361 0.359 0.359
Total Expenditures
Election year 49.952*** 34.768*** 36.112*** 28.407***
(5.597) (6.516) (6.204) (4.573)
Election year*Recession -5.260* 34.589** 19.123*** 29.853**
(-1.735) (2.458) (1.385) (2.431)
Observations 4,726 4,726 4,726 4,726
R-squared 0.558 0.555 0.554 0.555
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality. Recession variable defined as indicated in
the respective column title. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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